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Abstract: Communications in Information-Centric Networking place more attention on WHAT data are being exchanged
rather than WHO are exchanging them. A well-established approach of information centric networks is the
Network of Information (NetInf) architecture, developed as part of the EU FP7 project SAIL. The security of
NetInf has been fairly analysed in the literature. In particular, research efforts have been focusing on achieving
data integrity and confidentially, source or publisher authenticity and authorization. This paper analyses some
work in the literature to enforce authorized access to data in NetInf, highlights a potential security threat and
proposes an enhancement to address the discovered threat. The new enhancement has been formally verified
using formal method approach based on the Casper/FDR tool.
1 INTRODUCTION
A large number of emerging Internet applica-
tions requires information dissemination across dif-
ferent organizational boundaries and heterogeneous
platforms. The implementation of Information Cen-
tric Networks (ICNs) (B. Ahlgren, 2012) makes ef-
ficient content distribution possible by making infor-
mation retrieval host-independent and integration into
the network storage for caching information. Re-
quests for particular content can, thus, be satisfied
by any host or server holding a copy. One well-
established approach of ICNs is the Network of In-
formation (NetInf) architecture (D. Kutscher, 2013),
developed as part of the EU FP7 project SAIL. The
approach is based on the Publish/Subscribe model,
where hosts join a network, publish data, and sub-
scribe to publications. The NetInf introduces two
main stages namely, the Publication and Data Re-
trieval through which hosts publish and retrieve data.
Also, a distributed Name Resolution System (NRS)
has been introduced to map the data to its publishers.
Furthermore, data objects, such as web pages, articles
or videos are named and identified using the Uniform
Resource Identifier for Named Information (URI-ni)
format (H. Baker, 2012), hence these objects are re-
ferred to as Named Data Objects (NDOs).
The security of the NetInf architecture has been
discussed and analysed in a number of research ef-
forts in the literature such as (J. Loo, 2014) (K. Pen-
tikousis, 2013). In NetInf architecture, security mea-
sures are defined as part of the URI-ni naming scheme
(H. Baker, 2012) to guarantee the data integrity, con-
fidentiality and data source authenticity. As described
in (M. Aiash, 2014), security in NetInf focuses mainly
on the security of data objects while less interest is fo-
cused on the security of the infrastructure, network el-
ements and communication channels. Consequently,
the NetInf architecture is still vulnerable to security
attacks (M. Aiash, 2014) in form of data poisoning in
the NSR and Denial of Service (DoS).
Therefore, the work in (M. Aiash, 2014) proposed
a Registration Stage to take place prior to the Publi-
cation Stage. The Registration Stage involves a new
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol
based on the ID-Based Cryptography (IBC) (Shamir,
1985). The IBC helps to certify the messages sender
as the real owner of the NDO that will update the Net-
Inf system. It also involves a capability-based access
control mechanism (Gollmann, 2011) (Chen, 2014)
to enforce authorized access to data objects. How-
ever, unlike the AKA protocol, the access control
of (M. Aiash, 2014) has not been formally verified
neither critically analysed. Therefore, this paper con-
siders the security mechanisms in (M. Aiash, 2014),
and supported by formal methods approach, we dis-
cover a security vulnerability in the proposed access
control and introduce an enhancement. The enhance-
ment is formally verified using formal methods ap-
proach based on Casper/FDR tool.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of the NetInf architecture and
the proposed Registration Stage in (M. Aiash, 2014).
Section 3 formally verifies the proposed access con-
trol in (M. Aiash, 2014), describes the discovered at-
tack and proposes an extension to address the discov-
ered attack. The paper is concluded in Section 4.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 An Overview of the NetInf
In NetInf architecture, publishers advertise data ob-
jects in the NetInf system and serve them to sub-
scribers upon requests. The NetInf system acts as a
middleman between publishers and subscribers, and
is involved in configuring the forwarding path for data
delivery (Edwall, 2013). Three pairs of messages
have been defined as part of the NetInf architecture:
• The GET-REQ/GET-RESP messages: The GET
message is used by a requester to request an NDO
from the NetInf network. A node responding to
the GET message would send a GET-RESP that
is linked to the GET request using the message-Id
(msg-id) from the GET message.
• The PUBLISH-REQ/PUBLISH-RESP messages:
The PUBLISH message allows a publisher to
push the name and a copy of the NDO to the
network. A node receiving a PUBLISH mes-
sage may choose to cache the NDO according
to local policy and availability of resources and
returns PUBLISH-RESP message, otherwise, it
may choose to forward the message to other nodes
without sending the response message.
• The SEARCH/SEARCH-RESP messages: The
SEARCH message allows the requester to send a
set of query tokens containing search keywords.
The node that receives the SEARCH message,
will either respond if the NDO is in its own cache
or forward the SEARCH message.
These messages are supposed to be transported over
a Convergence Layer (CL) protocol. As stated
in (D. Kutscher, 2013), no CL protocol has been de-
fined yet, but any protocol that allows NetInf mes-
sages to be passed without loss of information can be
used as a NetInf Convergence Layer (NetInf-CL) pro-
tocol. These three pairs of messages define the trans-
actions of the Publication and Data Retrieval Stages
as follows:
1. The Publish Stage: Publishers publish their
NDOs to the NetInf system by sending the
PUBLISH-REQ message to the first hop node
which might choose to cache the included in-
formation and responds with a PUBLISH-RESP
message. Otherwise, it passes the PUBLISH-
REQ to the next hop route. A node that caches
NDO might update the NRS with the location of
the NDO.
2. The Data Retrieval Stage: As shown in Fig 1,
the NetInf combines two modes for data retrieval:
(a) The Name Resolution: In this mode, the pub-
lisher publishes an NDO using PUBLISH mes-
sage with a Name Resolution Service (NRS).
In this case, a requester will approach the NRS
first (using the GET message) which will direct
him to the information publisher.
(b) The Name-Based Routing: In this mode, the
GET message will be forwarded hop-by-hop
between NetInf nodes until a cached copy of
the requested NDO is found or the original pub-
lisher is reached.
2.2 Verifying Security Protocols using
Casper/FDR:
Previously, analysing security protocols used to go
through two stages. Firstly, modelling the proto-
col using a theoretical notation or language such as
the CSP (G. Lowe, 2009). Secondly, verifying the
protocol using a model checker such as Failures-
Divergence Refinement (FDR) (FDR, 1993). How-
ever, describing a system or a protocol using CSP
is a quite difficult and error-prone task; therefore,
Gavin Lowe has developed the CASPER/FDR tool
to model security protocols, it accepts a simple and
human-friendly input file that describes the system
and compiles it into CSP code which is then checked
using the FDR model checker. Casper/FDR has been
used to model communication and security proto-
cols as in (B. Donovan, 1999), (Aiash, 2014). The
CASPER’s input file that describes the systems con-
sists of eight headers as explained in Table 1.
2.3 The NetInf Registration Stage
In NetInf, data sources publish NDOs by registering
a name/locator binding with the NRS using the Pub-
lish message or announcing routing information in a
routing protocol. Subscribers will approach the NRS
requesting a specific NDO, and the NRS will first re-
solve the NDO into a set of available locators and then
Figure 1: The NetInf Message Flow. The Name Resolution mode (dashed Arrows). The Name-Based Routing (solid Ar-
rows) (M. Aiash, 2014)
Table 1: THE HEADERS OF CASPER’S INPUT FILE
The Header Description
# Free Vari-
ables
Defines the agents, variables and
functions in the protocol
# Processes Represents each agent as a process
# Protocol
Description
Shows all the messages exchanged
between the agents
# Specifica-
tion
Specifies the security properties to
be checked
# Actual Vari-
ables
Defines the real variables, in the ac-
tual system to be checked
# Functions Defines all the functions used in the
protocol
# System Lists the agents participating in the
actual system with their parameters
instantiated
# Intruder In-
formation
Specifies the intruder’s knowledge
and capabilities
retrieve the copy of the data from the best available
source.
In order to provide a secure data publication and
retrieval, the authors in (M. Aiash, 2014) propose a
new Registration Stage that comprises an Authentica-
tion and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol and autho-
rization and access control mechanism. During the
Registration Stage, both publishers and subscribers
need to identify themselves to the NRS and acquire
a security token that define their privileges and ac-
cess rights. These tokens will be used to enforce au-
thorized access to NDOs. The AKA protocol and an
authorization mechanisms are briefly described in the
following sections.
2.3.1 The Authentication and Key Agreement
Protocol
The proposed Registration Stage involves a new
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) pro-
tocol based on ID-Based Cryptography (IBC)
scheme (Shamir, 1985). The scheme requires the
presence of Trusted Key Generation (TKG) centres.
However, unlike the normal Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) where a TKG randomly generates pairs of pub-
lic/private keys, each node in IBC chooses its iden-
tifier (address or name) as a public key. Practically,
any publicly known information that uniquely identi-
fies the node could be used as a public key. The TKG
generates the corresponding private key and securely
distributes it to the node. More details about the AKA
protocol including formal analysis and security dis-
cussion are found in (M. Aiash, 2014).
On the successful completion of the AKA proto-
col, mutual authentication between the party (Pub or
Sub) and the NRS is achieved. The NRS will also
be able to confirm the published NDOs as valid and
authentic.
2.3.2 The Authorization Process Based on the
Capability-Access Control
Once a party (subscriber or publishers) is authenti-
cated, the NRS will generate security tokens. Two
types of tokens are generated: Object Tokens (Obj-
Token), attached with the published NDOs and Sub-
ject Tokens (SubToken) attached with subscribers.
These tokens define objects and subjects abilities. An
ability is represented as a dot-separated sequence of
numbers, called a label. So, an ability is a string
.i1.i2.i3......in for some value n where i1, i2, i3....., in
are integers. Examples of abilities are .1.2.3, .4, or
10.0.0.5. Upon successful registration, both NDOs
(objects) and subscribers (subjects) will be given la-
bels (abilities) as parts of their security tokens. Ac-
cess for an NDO is given if the NDO’s label is a prefix
of the subscriber’s label. For instance, an NDO with
a label ”.3” could only be accessed by subscribers
with abilities like ”.3.1”, ”.3.2.3”, ”.3.1.2”...etc. This
way, whenever an authenticated subscriber requests
an NDO, he needs to present the right label that con-
firms his right to access the NDO.
Labels are generated by the NRS so subscribers
can not promote themselves to access other NDOs,
and they will be integrated into the security tokens.
Furthermore, the security tokens are time stamped
and have expiry date after which new tokens are
needed. It also includes the party identification (ID),
so a security token will have the following tuple: To-
ken=ID, Label, Time Stamp, Expiry date. Using the
time stamp and the expiry time will minimize the risk
of a both active and passive replay attacks. Also, in-
cluding the party identification (ID) will strive against
impersonation attack. As part of the AKA protocol
in (M. Aiash, 2014), the security token are distributed
securely to the parties, and digitally signed by the
NRS to guarantee token’s integrity and authenticity.
3 The Authorized Data Retrieval
Procedure
This section describes the transactions between
subscribers, NRS and publishers to retrieve specific
NDOs. It then describes the limitation of the autho-
rization process described in section 2.3.2 and pro-
poses enhancements.
3.1 The Authorized Data Retrieval
Procedure
Based on the notations in Table 2. The procedure for
accessing data goes as follows:
Table 2: Notation
The Nota-
tion
Definition
SK(X),
PK(X)
The Private and Public keys of an entity
X
Pub The data source or the publisher of
NDO
NRS The Name Resolution Service which
holds the name/location binding for
NDOs
ObjToken A security token will be attached to the
published NDO
SubToken A security token will be attached to the
subscribers
h(m) Hash value of the message (m)
{m}{K} The message (m) being encrypted with
the key (K)
After a successful authentication during the
registration stage, the NRS generates the SubToken
and passes it to the Subscriber as Msg1. The message
is encrypted using the public key of the Sub, and the
SubToken is hashed and digitally signed using the
NRS private key for integrity and non-repudiation
reasons. In Msg2, the Subscriber approaches the NRS
to express interest of accessing a specific NDO using
the Get packet of the NetInf. The NRS responds
with the Get Response (GetRes) Packet as Msg3
which identifies the NDO’s publisher.The message
is encrypted using the subscriber’s public key. As
described in 2.3.1, the authentication protocol of the
registration stage is based on ID-Based authentication
scheme. In this scheme, nodes are free to choose
any publicly known information to identify them and
could be used as a public key. This eliminates the
need for distributing the keys as in the traditional
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Msg1. NRS→Sub: {SubToken,
({h(SubToken)}{SK(NRS)}}{PK(Sub)}
Msg2. Sub→ NRS: {Get}{PK(NRS)}
Msg3. NRS→ Sub: {GetRes}{PK(Sub)}
In Msg4, the subscriber approaches the publisher
for accessing the NDO. The message includes the
subscriber token and is encrypted using the PK(Pub).
On receiving Msg4, the publisher approaches the
NRS to check the validity of the included token(for
conciseness these transactions are not shown be-
low). If successful, the Pub compares the included
SubToken against the object token (ObjToken). If the
ObjToken is a prefix of the SubToken, access to the
NDO is given and the publisher sends the requested
NDO as in Msg5.
Msg4. Sub→Pub:{Get, SubToken,
({h(SubToken)}{SK(NRS)}}{PK(Pub)}
Msg5. Pub→ Sub: {NDO}{PK(Sub)}
3.2 Formal Analysis
To formally analyse the proposed solution, we sim-
ulate the system using Casper/FDR tool. The eight
headings of the simulated system are described below.
The #Free Variables section defines the variables
and functions that are used in the protocol. The term
”Free Variables” refers to the fact that these variables
will be represented by instances of actual values
when running the protocol. For instance, the vari-
ables SubToken, ObjToken are of type SubjectToken
and ObjectToken, respectively. The functions PK
and SK return an agent’s public key and private key,
respectively. These functions will be defined later in
the #Functions. The ”InverseKeys” keyword defines
the keys that are inverses of one another like PK and
SK.
#Free variables
Pub, NRS, Sub : Agent
SubToken: SubjectToken
ObjToken: ObjectToken
PK: Agent → PublicKey
SK: Agent → PrivateKey
InverseKeys = (PK,SK), (K1, K1),(K2, K2)
h : HashFunction
The #Processes heading defines each involved
agent in the protocol as a CSP process. The key-
word ”knows” defines the knowledge that the agent
in question is expected to have at the beginning
of the protocol run. In our system, INITIATOR,
RESPONDER and SERVER are the names of the
process representing the Subscriber, the Publisher
and the NRS server, respectively. The values within
the brackets and after the ”knows” keyword define
the agents’ initial knowledge.
#Processes
INITIATOR(Sub, NRS, SubToken,Get, GetRes)
knows PK, SK(Sub)
RESPONDER(Pub, NRS, ObjToken, Data) knows
PK, SK(Pub)
SERVER(NRS, Pub, Sub, SubToken, ObjToken,
GetRes) knows PK, SK(NRS)
The #Protocol description heading defines the
system and the transactions between the entities.
#Protocol description
0. -> Pub : NRS
1. NRS -> Sub :{SubToken,
({h(SubToken)}{SK(NRS)}%TKO)%w}{PK(Sub)}
2. Sub -> NRS: {Get}{PK(NRS)}
3. NRS-> Sub: {GetRes, Pub}{PK(Sub)}
4. Sub -> Pub : {Get, SubToken,
w%({h(SubToken)}{SK(NRS)}%TKO)}{PK(Pub)}
5. Pub -> Sub : {NDO}{PK(Sub)}
The security requirements of the system are de-
fined under the # Specification heading. The lines
starting with the keyword Secret define the secrecy
properties of the protocol. The Secret(Sub,
SubToken, [Pub, NRS]) specifies the SubToken
as a secret between the Sub, Pub and the NRS.
The lines starting with WeakAgreement define
the protocol’s authenticity properties; for instance,
the WeakAgreement(Pub, Sub) assertion could be
interpreted as follows: if Pub has completed a run of
the protocol with Sub, then Sub has previously been
running the protocol, apparently with Pub.
#Specification
Secret(Pub, Data, [Sub])
Secret(Sub, SubToken, [Pub, NRS])
WeakAgreement(Pub, Sub)
WeakAgreement(Sub, Pub)
The # Intruder Information heading specifies the
intruder identity, knowledge and capability. The first
line identifies the intruder as Mallory, the intruder
knowledge defines the Intruder’s initial knowledge,
i.e., we assume that the intruder knows the identity
of the participants, all public keys, its own private
key and can fabricate Register-Request and Register-
Response messages.
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {pub, nrs, Mallory,
PK, SK(Mallory),get, getRes}
After generating the CSP description of the sys-
tems using Casper and asking FDR to check the
security specifications, the following attack has been
discovered.
1a. nrs -> I sub : {subToken,
{h(subToken)}{SK(nrs)}}{PK(sub)}
Figure 2: The Discovered MITM Attack
1b. I nrs -> sub : {subToken,
{h(subToken)}{SK(nrs)}}{PK(sub)}
2a. sub -> I nrs : {get}{PK(nrs)}
2b. I sub -> nrs : {get}{PK(nrs)}
3a. nrs -> I sub : {getRes,
pub}{PK(sub)}
3b. I nrs -> sub : {getRes,
pub}{PK(sub)}
4a. sub -> I pub : {get, subToken,
{h(subToken)}{SK(nrs)}}{PK(pub)}
4b. I nrs -> pub : {get, subToken,
{h(subToken)}{SK(nrs)}}{PK(pub)}
5. pub -> I nrs : {NDO}{PK(nrs)}
The notations I sub, I pub and I nrs represent
the case where the Intruder impersonates the Sub,
Pub and NRS respectively. As shown in Fig 2, the
discovered attack is a Man-in-the-Middle attack,
where the Intruder intercepts and replays the mes-
sages. This attack could be interpreted as follows:
the Sub believes (s)he is running the protocol, taking
role INITIATOR, with the Pub, using data items
subToken while it was with the intruder instead.
Similarly, the Pub believes (s)he has completed a run
of the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with NRS,
using data items NDO.
3.3 The Refined Version of the Proposed
Mechanism
The problem with the initial version of the mecha-
nism is that the Pub does not check if Msg4 is fresh
and has been sent directly by the Pub. To accomplish
such check, a challenge-response session between
the Pub and the Sub will take place to guarantee the
freshness of the message and the aliveness of the
Figure 3: Casper/FDR Verification Result
involved participants. The new sequence of messages
looks as follows:
Msg1. NRS→Sub: {SubToken,
({h(SubToken)}{SK(NRS)}}{PK(Sub)}
Msg2. Sub→ NRS: {Get}{PK(NRS)}
Msg3. NRS→ Sub:{GetRes}{PK(Sub)}
Msg4. Sub→Pub:{Get, SubToken,
({h(SubToken)}{SK(NRS)}}{PK(Pub)}
Msg5. Pub→Sub: {n, SubToken}{PK(Sub)}
Msg6. Sub→Pub: {n}{PK(Pub)}
Msg7. Pub→Sub: {NDO}{PK(Sub)}
Unlike the initial version, the Pub will not send
the requested NDO after receiving Msg4, rather it
sends a randomly generated nonce (n) as challenge
to the Sub in addition to the received SubToken
as Msg5. On receiving this message, the Sub will
verify that the included SubToken is the actual one
sent in Msg4, hence it makes sure that Pub is alive.
The Sub will return the challenge (n) as Msg6.
This is a crucial transaction for the security of the
proposed mechanism; an intruder will not be able to
compose Msg6, it can only replay Msg5. The Pub
will verify the included nonce in Msg6 and make
sure that the Sub is alive. If everything is fine, the
Pub will forward the requested NDO to Sub as Msg7.
Furthermore, even if an intruder intercepts messages
1,2 and 3 and fabricates Msg4 with its own fabricated
token, he will not be able to fake the signature of the
NRS and hence the attack will fail on the check after
Mag4. The new version of the mechanism has been
checked with Casper/FDR and no attack has been
found as shown in Fig 3.
It is worth to point out that the security of the pro-
posed protocol is based on the system and the capa-
bility of the attacker as defined in (M. Aiash, 2014).
Hence, the verification results might be different in
new system or with a more capable attacker. Further-
more, it functionalities of the system entries such as
the NRS node has been defined as part of the pro-
posal in (M. Aiash, 2014). The authors acknowledge
that different design might scale and prove to be more
resilient, however, such modifications to the system
might increase the complexity of the system in terms
of establishing a trust relationship between the new
entity and the existing ones.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Network of Information (NetInf) is one proposed
approach for Information-Centric Networking (ICN).
In NetInf, publishers publish their data (through the
Publication stage) to the NRS system which then
launch these data to subscribers upon request (through
the Data Retrieval Stage). Previous work in the lit-
erature has explained how the Publication Stage is
vulnerable to masquerading and content poisoning at-
tacks which might happen when an unauthenticated
node publishes invalid data to the system. The work
proposed authentication protocol is based on the IBC
protocol and achieves mutual authentication between
publishers and the NetInf system and enforce autho-
rization. This paper discovers a security flaw in the
access control and authorization mechanism and us-
ing formal methods approach propose enhancements
to address the security flaw.
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